British Wildlife Law Before the American Revolution:  Lessons from the Past by Lund, Thomas A.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 74 Issue 1 
1975 
British Wildlife Law Before the American Revolution: Lessons 
from the Past 
Thomas A. Lund 
University of Houston, Bates College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Animal Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Natural Resources Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas A. Lund, British Wildlife Law Before the American Revolution: Lessons from the Past, 74 MICH. L. 
REV. 49 (1975). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol74/iss1/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
BRITISH WILDLIFE LAW BEFORE THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: LESSONS 
FROM THE PAST 
Thomas A. Lund* 
I. GOALS------------------
A. Sustained Yield ____________ _ 
B. Weapons Control ____________ _ 
1. In Earnest _____________ _ 
2. For Fun ______________ _ 
C. Class Discrimination __________ _ 
D. Wildlife Rights ___________ _ 
B. The Interrelationship of the Goals ______ _ 
II METHODS-----------------A. Take Limitations ____________ _ 
B. Habitat Development __________ _ 













EARLY legislation may excite the condescending interest ·that Dr. 
Johnson directed toward a dog walking on its hind legs: "It is not 
done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all."1 British wild-
life law, however, merits more respect. As long ago as the Middle 
Ages, man's appetite for meat endowed legislators with at least an 
ambling competence at wildlife management. Nor has the passage 
of time made their efforts wholly irrelevant. Early methods of con-
trolling habitat, for example, may still be appropriate since historical 
change has not altered the needs of animals as it has those of men. 
This is not to say that within the bestiary of early British law there 
does not run many a droll species of regulation, amusing only be-
cause of its ludicrous appearance. Indeed, within the following dis-
cussion of the goals and methods of those laws, a kind of carnival 
fever may appear at times to have overtaken the legislators. But 
such are the parallels between early problems and those faced today 
that in the end, to a surprising degree, the stock of old laws can still 
provide exemplary service. 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston, Bates College of Law. 
A.B. 1964, Harvard University; LL.B. 1%7, Columbia University.-Ed. 
The author wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the support given by the Na-
tional Wildlife Federation for his research at Worcester College, Oxford, England. 
1. J. BOSWELL, LIFE OF JoHNSON 535 (G. Birbeck Hill ed. 1921). 
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I. GOALS 
Wildlife law has four major goals, and early British legislation 
recognized them all. First, laws can facilitate the sustained periodic 
harvest of wildlife. Wildlife management can be designed with the 
same balance sheet mentality that characterizes any ranching opera-
tion, with adjustments made for the peculiarities of wild stock. Sec-
ond, wildlife statutes can be drawn primarily to regulate human be-
havior. Because hunting provides one of the few justifications for 
the use of weapons, laws purportedly enacted to control hunting may 
actually be designed either to restrict or to encourage the use of 
weapons. Moreover, hunters themselves may solicit limitations on 
their freedom to use certain hunting methods, thereby enhancing 
their sport by increasing the challenge to their skill. Third, wildlife 
laws can be designed to favor particular groups. Because wild ani-
mals are not ordinarily subject to man's control, and control seems 
the basis for most popular views of ownership, wildlife may be 
treated as a unique form of wealth. Lawmakers may thus be able 
to grant hunting privileges to a favored group without exciting the 
contention that would ensue were privileges granted with respect to 
other forms of property. Fourth, wildlife regulations can aim to vin-
dicate what are supposed to be the desires of the animals themselves. 
~e some assert that rights can belong only to people, 2 a curious 
convergence of both very primitive and very sophisticated law would 
protect the rights of other than human supplicants. 3 Living wild ani-
mals have been a congenial vehicle for the manifestation of this doc-
trine. 
A. Sustained Yield 
The concept that the yearly harvest of a species might be limited 
so that the remaining numbers can breed and replenish the stock 
has been the common intellectual property of mankind since the 
dawn of the pastoral era.4 The numbers· and the breeding habits 
of wild animals, however, are less obvious than those of domestic 
beasts; techniques to manage wildlife for sustained yield have there-
fore been more difficult to develop. 
2. See, e.g., Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 
N.E. 812, 814 (1900) (Holmes, C.J.) ("All proceedings, like all rights, are really 
against persons"). 
3. See C. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR 
NATURAL OBJECTS (1972); C. ELTON, THE EcOLOGY OF INVASIONS BY ANIMALS AND 
PLANTS 143 (1958). 
4. See generally J. BRONOWSKI, 'lim ASCENT OF MAN 59-89 (1973). 
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The final slaughter of British wolves, said to have been called 
for by Kings Edgar and Canute, 5 proved that intensive hunting could 
destroy a species. The information necessary to manage a harvest 
for sustained yield, however, was more complex than that required 
for extermination. The population dynamics of different species 
vary widely, and estimation of the resiliency of a species in the face 
of large breeding stock depletions is no simple task. 6 Some early 
English laws reflect this difficulty. At one time the legislators be-
lieved that hares had been "amost utterly destroyed"7 by hunting, an 
event that Australians might wish to have been more likely. Acor-
vine irruption of the sixteenth century was also less susceptible to 
man's efforts at control than was believed by framers of a bounty 
measure.8 The lawmakers feared: "[l]f the said crows, rooks and 
choughs should be suffered to breed and continue, as they have been 
m certain years past, they will undoubtedly be the cause of the great 
destruction and consumption of a great part of the com and grain 
which hereafter shall be sown throughout this realm . . . ."9 For-
tunately, however, the danger to Britain was not nearly so grave. 
Hunting incentives or restrictions do not significantly affect the 
total numbers of a species when human pressure simply substitutes 
for natural causes of mortality and prematurely removes individual 
animals that would not in any case have affected the breeding pool.10 
The arts of weaponry were so poorly developed and the numbers 
of hunters were generally so limited that early lawmakers did not 
need to restrict the harvest to the degree presently necessary. But 
when unusual conditions did endanger a desirable species, British 
lawmakers acted to preserve the stock. Dammioe was recognized 
as an industrial peril to anadromous fish as early as the fourteenth 
century, and weirs were required in dams to facilitate spawning-runs 
5. J. MANWOOD, T.REAnss OF THB FoREST LAws 161 (4th ed. W. Nelson 1717). 
6. Scientists still dispute, for example, the resiliency of certain whale species that 
have been heavily depleted by man, Fitter, Future for Whales, 12 ORYX 532 (1974), 
and tlie breeding functions of bighorn rams older than ten years, Tennesen, Bighorn 
on the Run, NATIONAL Wn.DLIFB, Oct.-Nov. 1975, at 9. 
7. 14 & 15 Hen. 8, c. 10, § 1 (1522). 
8. 24 Hen. 8, c. 10, § 7 (1532). 
9. 24 Hen. 8, c. 10, § 1 (1532). 
10. In a resilient population, severe loss rates may in effect substitute for each 
other without mounting up excessively high in total. Extraordinary losses 
through one agency may automatically protect from losses through many other 
agencies. The death of one individual may mean little more than improving the 
chances for living of another one. Furthermore, in some species, extraordinary 
losses may be compensated by accelerated reproduction, more young being pro-
duced in consequence of more being destroyed. 
P. EluuNGTON, OF PREDATION AND LIFE 229 (1967). 
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ascending the streams.11 The legislators also restricted particular 
methods of taking against which a species was thought defenseless. 
Hares could not be tracked in the snow;12 nor could herons, vulner-
able targets indeed, be taken by firearms.13 
The income that can be derived from the sustained yield of wild-
life can be both a factor in and an incentive toward management. 
It has recently been established as such in the United States; from 
1955 to 1965 the annual income derived by American landowners 
from hunting and fishing increased from $3 million to $97 million. 14 
In the early nineteenth century the importance of this consideration 
was emphasized by scholars who advocated changes in the British 
law. Edward Christian, Professor of Law at Cambridge, asserted 
that, were occupiers allowed rights to game, "it would soon become 
a serious and most important problem for the agriculturist to solve, 
viz. What quantity of Game should be supported and sold upon a 
given farm, or what proportion it should bear to the vegetable pro-
duction, that the sum of both should be the greatest, or would best 
enable the occupier to pay his rent and maintain his family."16 
B. Weapons Control 
1. In Earnest 
Hunting rules can achieve a serious martial goal. Except for tar-
get practice and self-defense, hunting provides the only lawful occa-
sion for a private citizen to use weapons. And, particularly with the 
limited arsenal of weapons formerly available, a practiced sportsman 
might be far superior to an amateur in martial skills. The security 
of the established rule will therefore be increased if government sup-
porters are encouraged to hunt and potential dissidents are prohib-
ited from hunting.16 
The British have always been adept at finding a serious purpose 
11. 17 Rich. 2, c. 9, § 1 (1393). 
12. 14 & 15 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1522). 
13. 19 Hen. 7, c. 11, § 1 (1503). 
14. REPORT OF THE 58TH CONVENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OP 
GAME, FISH AND CONSERVATION COMMISSIONERS 155 (1968). 
15. E. CHRISTIAN, THE GAME LAws 304 (1817). Another scholar explained that, 
were the sale of game legalized, "proprietors might find the expenses of preservation 
repaid by the profits of sale." C. LoNG, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE GAME LAWS 17 
(2d ed. 1825). 
16. As one game-law commentator observed, one analysis of early British game 
laws concluded that "they were originally made with a view of taking the arms out 
of the hands of the common people, or at least with a design of rendering them inex-
pert1 in the use of them• • • ." s. PURLEWBNT, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A LAWYER 
AND A CoUNTRY GENILEMAN UPON THE SUBJECT OF THE GAME LAWS 14 (3d ed. 
1771) (copy in the Bodleian Law Librazy, Oxford, England). 
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behind apparently frivolous pastimes, and hunting behavior is no ex-
ception. Considerably before Wellington saw the earnest goals of 
youthful sport ("The battle of Waterloo was won on the playing 
fields of Eton ... "),17 legislators had proclaimed that unless hunt-
ing were wisely practiced, the security of the realm would be endan-
,gered. Not long after the rout of the French at Agincourt, a law was 
designed to ensure continued British skill with the long bow. Ac-
cording to the legislative prologue, that weapon had "subdued and 
reduced divers and many regions and countries to their due 
obeisance, to the great honour, fame and surety of th[e] realm and 
-subjects, and to the terrible dread and fear of all strange nations. 
" 18 The use of new hunting techniques might have sapped 
Britain'-s strength; controls were therefore imposed to prevent the 
-citizenry from relying too heavily on that novelty, the gun.19 
While affording supporters of the crown continued practice with 
arms, British game laws20 also sought to disarm dissidents. 21 Black-
stone maintained that the earliest game laws were part of feudal pol-
icy to exclude the defeated from the use of arms: "[N]othing could 
do this more effectually than a prohibition of hunting and sporting. 
"
22 Although their purpose might be "oftener meant than 
avowed," subsequent legislators continued to espouse this policy.23 
Some propagandist maintained that these covert aims underlay hunt-
ing rules imposed after the bloodless revolution: 
Before these useful laws :were made, 
Each lively youth, each jolly blade 
Well knew the use of hostile arms, 
Ready prepared for war's alarms, 
But since we have a Revolution 
And alter'd much our Constitution, 
It is decreed, each Bird-each Beast, 
Shall have in part Quietum est .... 24 
17. This statement is attributed to the Duke of Wellington in J. BARTI.BTr, 
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 400 (13th ed. 1955). 
18. 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, § 2 (1541). 
19. 33 Hen. 8, c. 6, ·§ 1 (1541). 
20. "Game" has been a term of art narrowly limned. Professor Christian, for 
example, observed regarding a statute including as "game" pigeon, fish, and fowl: 
"Could anyone have supposed this possible in a land of learning and liberty?" E. 
CmusTIAN, supra note 15, at 9. Despite this weighty caution, however, the term will 
be used generally throughout this discussion to describe any wild animal subject to 
taking for food or sport. 
21. See note 16 supra. 
22. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413. 
23. Id. at *413-14. 
24. E. TuoMAS, AN ABsTRAcr OF ALL mB GAME LAws 4 (10th ed. 1784) (copy 
in the Bodleian Law Library, Oxford, England). 
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Some early legislators did not conceal their belief that unless un-
reliable elements were forbidden the use of weapons, they would 
become competent with arms and then imperil the safety of the 
country. Fourteenth century lawmakers had instituted hunting reg-
ulations because they had observed that "sometime under such 
colour [of hunting, groups] make their assemblies, conferences, and 
conspiracies for to rise and disobey their allegiance . . . ."25 Sub-
sequent statutes identified even more precisely the danger posed by 
permitting the poor to use weapons: Tempted to poach, they might 
experience success and then turn to such graver offenses as burglary 
and highway robbery.26 
Incidents, even in the early nineteenth century, show that the 
challenge by poachers to civil authority was not insignificant. Testi-
mony before the House of Lords Committee on the Game Laws 
gives an idea of the force poachers could mount: 
In the middle of November 1826, a large concourse of poachers, 
to the amounts of about 50, attacked a wood of mine, at about half 
past eleven in the evening; about 28 of them were armed with guns, 
about 12 with sticks, the remainder with a stone in each hand, by 
which they kept making noise by knocking them against each other, 
for the purpose of keeping the persons in line going through the 
woods; and on the outside of the wood were two men on horse back, 
about 50 yards from one another, who had horns, and they directed 
in which rway the line should be carried on. In that way they thor-
oughly went through the wood, firing a great number of times, and 
killed a large quantity of Pheasants. My keepers were there, but 
finding the force was very large, they were unable to cope with them; 
and according to the orders I always gave them, not to have any af-
fray of that nature, unless they were sure of being successful, -they 
were only able to look on, and not to take any steps for saving the 
Game.27 
25. 13 Rich. 2. c. 13, § 1 (1389). 
26. See, e.g., 4 & 5 W. & M., c. 23, § 1 (1692). As one commentator observed, 
"[A]ll the statutes made for the preservation of the game, agree in the character of 
such men; for they tell us, that they are of the vulgar sort, and of little or no worth; 
that they are loose, idle, disorderly and dissolute persons; that they ruin themselves 
and families, and damnify their neighbors; and by neglecting all lawful employment, 
they commonly tum highwaymen and burglars." W. NELSON, THE LAW OF ENGLAND 
CONCERNING nm GAME preface (1727). 
27. PARL. PAPERS (Lords), 1828 (235), [Reports] vol. 8, p. 3·33 (Report from the 
House of Lords Committee on the Game Laws). Another taste of the dangers 
presented by resistance to the game laws is provided by a warning protesting the 
penalty of transportation for poaching that was sent in 1816 to prominent landown-
ers near Bath: 
[T]he first of our country that this law is inflicted on . • • there shall not one 
gentleman's seat in our country escape the rage of fire. We are nine in number; 
and we will bum every gentleman's house of note. The first that impeaches 
shall be shot. We have sworn not to impeach. You may think it a threat, but 
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These dangers were part of the inspiration for a scheme known 
generally as the "qualification statutes," which allowed the use of 
various weapons for hunting only to those with a vested interest in 
the established rule. 28 Thereby did the law both arm the powerful 
and disarm those whom Blackstone described as the "rustici. "29 The 
caste-like overtones of the scheme were emphasized by enforcement 
provisions that authorized the qualified to disarm the unqualified. 30 
2. ForFun 
Because the qualification statutes ensured that everyone legally 
interested in game could fill his belly by other means, no great emer-
gency required that wildlife be harvested in an effective and efficient 
manner. A hunter's goal might not be to bag his quarry with maxi-
mum dispatch, but rather to delay the pleasure as long as decently 
possible. 
Besides being too effective and thereby spoiling good sport, 
some hunting practices were abhorrent because they were unpleas-
ant to a person of sensitivity. Rudimentary firearms, for example, 
were not elegant. They were loud and smelly. Through the seven-
teenth century they were "fired by a match, and [were] thought a 
mode of killing game not fit to be pursued by a gentleman."31 Their 
use was restricted.-32 Considerations of taste also helped to prohibit 
a practice now described as "jacklighting,"33 but during the sixteenth 
century called hunting by "lowbels." Groups would venture forth 
after dark ringing bells and flashing lights and then easily gather up 
partridges and pheasants stupefied by the spectacle. 34 The comedic 
overtones of this sport coupled with its lethal efficiency led to its 
prohibition. 35 
C. Class Discrimination 
The third goal of wildlife regulation has. been to secure unequal 
distribution of the right to utilize wildlife. In other areas of the law, 
they will find it a reality. The Game Laws were too severe before. The Lord 
of all men sent these animals for the peasant as well as the prince. 
Quoted in B. CHRISTIAN, supra note 15, at 292-94. 
28. See text at notes 39-50 infra. 
29. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *413. 
30. 33 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 2 (1541). 
31. E. CHRISTIAN, supra note 15, at 6. 
32. 33 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 2 (1541). 
33. Frog hunting with jack lights, for example, is prohibited during· certain 
months under Louisiana law. LA. RE.v. STAT. ANN. § 56:369 (West 1952) •• 
34. W. NELSON, supra note 26, at 216. 
35. 23 Eliz. 1, c. 10, §§ 1-3 (1581). 
56 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:49 
subtle insight may be required to ferret out legislative techniques 
used to beggar the powerless, 36 but early British game law requires 
no such acuity. Class discriminations were openly embraced from 
the earliest periods until at least the mid-nineteenth century. Their 
legacy of ill feelings may still imbue some condemnation of wildlife 
protectors as "elitists."87 
In 1389, the course of wildlife law was confirmed by a reference 
to "gentlemen's game,"38 and this attitude was elaborated into a 
comprehensive scheme in the qualification statutes. Until their abo-
lition in 1831,30 the qualification statutes allowed only prominent cit-
izens to take game, to possess certain weapons, and ultimately, to 
eat certain animals. 
Although codes of conduct contemporaneous with early qualifi-
cation statutes provided some means for identifying a gentleman, the 
British legislators generally took a more pragmatic view. Money 
was the principal touchstone. The earliest qualification statute al-
lowed hunting rights only to a lay person who owned lands worth 
forty shillings annually or to a cleric who held a yearly living of ten 
pounds. 40 The value of the base land was later raised to one 
hundred pounds.41 Wealth was also a test for the use of hunting 
gear. One statute, with limited exceptions, denied the use of hand-
guns to those with an estate worth less than one hundred pounds. 42 
Naked figures mean something, of course, only to those savants 
familiar with the exchange rate between different historical periods. 
Blackstone's juxtaposition of two different qualifications provides a 
more vivid perspective on the statutes' effect: "[F]ifty times the 
property [is required] to enable a man to kill a partridge, as to vote 
for a knight of the shire . . . ."43 
Some of the statutes eschewed the reliable monetary test and in-
36. The development of the law of equal protection in the United States provides 
one example. See generally Equal Protection of the lAws, in SELECTED EssAYS ON 
CoNSTITUilONAL LAw, 1938-1962, at 789-968 (E. Barrett, Jr. & N. Nathanson eds. 
1963). 
31. Cf. text at notes 144-48 infra. 
38. 13 Rich. 2, c. 13, § 1 (1389). 
39. 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32, § 6 (1831). 
40. 13 Rich. 2, c. 13, § 1 (1389). 
41. 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 25, § 3 (1670). See also 1 Jae. 1, c. 27, § 1 (1604). 
This increase, however, may simply have been an adjustment for inflation. J. PAUL, 
GAME LAws appendix (3d ed. 1780). 
42. 33 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 1 (1541). 
43. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *175. This observation was countered 
by the remarkable rejoinder that "the law surely would be more oppressive, if it re-
quired a greater qualification for a vote for a representative in parliament, than for 
the amusement of a sportsman." E. CmusnAN, supra note 15, at 125. 
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stead invoked terms of art. One limited the use of hailshot (an early 
form of shotgun) to those of the "degree of a Lord of the Parlia-
ment."44 Another reserved the power to appoint gamekeepers to 
"lords of manors, or other royalties, not under the degree of an es-
quire .... "45 While "the degree of an esquire" clearly did not 
comprehend every base scrivener, the term was imprecise. One 
commentator explained that the title belonged to "whomever either 
by blood, or place in the state, or other eminency, we conceive some 
higher attribute should be given than that sole title of gentleman. 
. . ."46 Other views had it that the title belonged to those "whose 
fortune can enable them to maintain an army of gamekeepers, and 
whose nerves are sufficiently firm to risk the constant exposure of 
human life in the protection of a mere amusement."47 
Precedent was ample for the gentry's appropriation of the right 
to hunt, 48 but perhaps excepting the Olympian policy regarding am-
brosia, no ruling class had ever sought to comer a particular food. 
Culinary monopoly, however, was a salient goal of the British game 
laws in their mature form. It had been perceived only gradually as 
a worthy end for legislation. The various restrictions on hunting had 
only barred the lower classes from themselves running the animals 
to earth; they might still buy the meat on the open market. But 
subsequently, the sale of game was restricted in such a way as to 
disclose a vigorous intent to preserve game from contact with a base 
gullet. 
At first the law restricted the purchase of game only if it were 
then held for resale; one might patronize a poacher if one intended 
to eat the meat oneself.49 As with today's de facto law of prostitu-
tion, the sale was illegal but the purchase was not. This exception, 
however, allowed both the qualified and the unqualified to eat game, 
and that was inconsistent with the socially discriminatory policy be-
hind the restrictions. So, while purchase for consumption remained 
legal, a statutory presumption was established that any unqualified 
person who possessed game held it for the purpose of resale. 50 This 
44. 6 & 7 W. & M., c. 13, § 3 (1694). 
45. 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 25, § 2 (1670). 
46. J. PAUL, supra note 41, appendix. 
47. BEAUTIES OF THE GAME LAWS 13-14 (1823) (anonymous pamphlet in the 
Bodleian Law Librazy, Oxford, England). Gamekeepers arguably were entitled to 
kill poachers who fled upon being detected. E. CHRISTIAN, supra note 15, at 144. 
48. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *413-14. 
49. 32 Hen. 8, c. 8, § 8 (1540), established the first such prohibition against the 
sate of pheasants. 
50. 5 Anne, c. 14, § 2 (1706); 9 Anne, c. 25, § 2 (1710). 
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presumption finally sealed inviolate the gastronomic preserve of the 
upper classes. 
With these restrictions protecting the status of game, it attained 
an "artificial pre-eminence"111 and became the delicacy without 
which no feast would be complete.112 During the heyday of the re-
strictions on sale, for example, the chief official of London cele-
brated Lord Mayor's Day with a banquet including seventy dishes 
of partridge, pheasant, and hare, all animals that legally could not 
be sold.53 
Several rationales might be advanced for this unusual concern 
with who might taste certain meat, explanations that need not rely 
on the alchemical eighteenth century critique that "[o]ne would al-
most be tempted to think, from the peculiar attention the legislature 
hath in all ages paid to the preservation of the Game, that there was 
some sovereign medicinal quality in the blood and juices of these 
animals . . . ."54 One possible explanation is that, during the earli-
est periods of regulation, wildlife was a considerable part of the pro-
ductivity of land. This was particularly true when many large tracts 
had not been subdued to domestic agriculture. Wildlife had in fact 
been allocated to various feudal vassals, Blackstone asserted, in order 
to shore-up their power and allegiance. 55 This theory is not wholly 
satisfactory, however, because in subsequent years wildlife became 
economically less significant and qualification statutes continued to 
be enacted and enforced. 
Qualification statutes might have been justified on the theory 
that they gave the landowner rights to what, after all, was supported 
by his land.56 This rationale, however, fails to account for two as-
51. C. LoNG, supra note 15, at 43. 
52. As one commentator observed, if the sale of widgeon or teal were against the 
law, "[i]t would be viewed in the light of a forbidden fruit, and every opulent house-
holder would aim at the possession of so fashionable a delicacy." Id. 
53. A report of this incredible bill of fare observed that the law against the sale 
of game "had introduced a graduated system of temptation, from the Lord Mayor 
to the labourer." Id. at 42. Another author observed: 
Under the law it might happen, that the lord mayor might be required to punish 
the purveyor of the civic feasts; nay, more, horresco referens, the Mansion-house 
might be subjected to a search, and a fine imposed on the chief magistrate of 
the city of London (if an unqualified person) for the splendid fare produced 
for the entertainment of the princes, and nobles, and statesman, and citizens of 
the land. 
BEAUTIES OF THE GAME LAWS, supra note 47, at 12. 
54. S. PURLEWENT, supra note 16, at x. 
55. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *413. 
56. One nineteenth century commentator stated: 
As to the defence of the landowner against qualified persons, we often read no-
tices to the following effect: "Qualified persons are requested not to trespass on 
these woods, &c.: all trespassers will be prosecuted:" that is to say, a man pur-
chases lands, he incurs great expense in turning out, feeding, and watching his 
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pects of the qualification scheme. Under typical statutes, owners of 
properties worth less than the statutory amount who were equally 
subject to wildlife depredations were not qualified to kill the damag-
ing animals. 57 On the other hand, some statutes qualified the so-
cially eminent without regard to whether they owned any land at 
all,58 
A fourteenth-century eleemosynary rationale postulated that the 
system was conceived not to favor the powerful, but to improve the 
weak: While hunting might concededly be an amusing diversion, 
the pastime could ensnare those without sufficient responsibility to 
see where first duties lay. Legislators had in fact observed that "div-
ers artificers, labourers, and servants, and grooms" had indulged in 
hunting even "on the holydays, when good Christian people be at 
church, hearing divine service .... "59 The qualification statutes 
were therefore designed to help these misdirected souls. Further-
more, the denial of game to certain groups might be the last spur 
necessary to encourage them to surmount their lethargy and apply 
themselves with the degree of effort needed to join the ranks of the 
elite. As a Member of Parliament from Oxford explained, the qual-
ification statutes actually were "inducements to the acquisition of 
learning and honour, and to the perserverance necessary to attain 
the stations which conferred them . . . . [Thus, they were] cheap 
incentives to exertion."60 
Finally, a proto-Marxist approach examined the consequences to 
productivity if game were available to all. Labor would then fall 
to short supply, for "it will scarcely be contended that the labourer 
would prefer continued toil and low wages to occasional indolence 
and high profits. If the peace or safety of the country was really 
game, and he humbly requests persons, who are protected by superior property 
or rank from summary process, not to rob him of that which he has acquired. 
Should such trespasser be detected, the proprietor has the enviable power of com-
paring purses with him, by action at law in our courts, which, like the London 
Tavern, always open their doors to those who are able to pay. 
BEAUTIES OF THE GAME LAws, supra note 47, at 14. 
57. [A] man may be possessed of thousands of acres of inferior land, abound-
ing in every species of game, the very beau ideal of the sportsman, but unless 
the value amount to one hundred pounds per annum, the unfortunate proprietor 
is totally deprived of the enjoyment of that right of property; but the owner of 
a small fraction of an acre, in some confined alley in the city, where not a head 
of game has been bred in the memory of man, shall be qualified to sport where-
ever permission is given him. 
Id. at 8. 
58. E.g., 1 Jae. 1, c. 27, § 3 (1604), included among the qualified those who were 
"the son or sons of any knight, or of any baron of parliament, or of some person 
of higher degree, or the son and heir apparent of any esquire . • . ." 
59. 13 Rich. 2, c. 13 (1389). 
60. Quoted in C. LoNo, supra note 15, at 62-63· (emphasis original). 
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to be determined in this way, it would be better at once to accelerate 
the return to domestic habits by an extirpation edict, as in the case 
of the wolves . . . ."61 
Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that game became ex-
clusive provender for the rich. As "E. Thomas, Astronomer" wag-
gishly counseled the masses: 
Therefore of Partridge, Pheasant, Hare, 
You must not eat-of this beware! 
For Gentlemen-who're men of might 
Have just laid down what they think right; 
But right or wrong-'tis all the same, 
They will, and must have all the Game. 62 
D. Wildlife Rights 
The vindication of the supposed desires of wild animals them-
selves is the fourth purpose of wildlife law. That the law can recog-
nize nonhuman rights has recently been reemphasized (or, perhaps 
more accurately, rediscovered) in the United States, notably by Pro-
fessor Stone63 and Justice Douglas. 64 
Early Englishmen perceived the transition from nonhuman to 
human as a continuum rather than a sharp break;6a the view that 
animals themselves might possess rights was therefore not preposter-
ous to them. 66 Indeed, protection of the rights of animals was con-
sistent with the widespread practice of holding them for their 
wrongs67 and required only that a champion be found to assert their 
interests. That spokesman was the king. The king's concern for 
wildlife was voiced through an entire jurisdiction, separate from the 
common law and complete in itself, that was effective until about 
the sixteenth century: the Forest Jurisdiction. 68 Within this area, 
61. Id. at 31. See 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 2S, § 1 (1670). 
62. E. THOMAS, supra note 24, at 4. 
63. See C. STONE, supra note 3. 
64. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 40S U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). . 
(iS. See E. TILLYARD, THE ELTZABEIBAN WORLD PICTURE 23-33 (1943). 
66. Manwood, for example, observed that hunting was prohibited on Sunday be-
cause it was "a Day appointed for the Rest both of Man and beasts .•.• " J. MAN• 
WOOD, supra note S, at 297. 
61. See E. EVANS, THB CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF 
ANIMALS (1906). Among the instances of prosecutions or excommunications of ani-
mals, Evans cites the following: a dog in Scotland in the first half of the sixteenth 
century; a dog in Chichester, England in 1771; a cock in Leeds, England in the nine-
teenth century; and, in New Haven, Connecticut, only 39 years before the chartering 
of Yale, a cow, two heifers, three sheep, and two sows. Id. at 32S-34. 
68. Manwood's treatise, first published "about the later End of the Reign of 
Queen Elizabeth," is a lament for the decay of the jurisdiction. J. MANWOOD, supra 
note 5, preface. 
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special doctrines protected wildlife, special officials policed those 
regulations, 69 and special courts balanced the rights of men against 
the rights of wildlife. 70 
One might contend that the system was conceived not to vindi-
cate wildlife rights, but to foster sport for the king and those to whom 
he had granted his authority. The brute wards of the jurisdiction 
did apparently include only those species that provided good hunt-
ing. 71 On the other hand, John Man wood, a scholar and judge dur-
ing the sixteenth century who attempted to revive the system from 
desuetude, surmised that hunting sport was not the only end the sys-
tem sought to achieve. Rather, he asserted, the king found "[d]elight 
and [p]leasure" from those animals that might "rest and abide" within 
the forest, content in his "safe [p]rotection."72 
Whatever its basic purpose, the jurisdiction provides a striking 
example of a sophisticated legal system constructed upon the premise 
that animals themselves hold rights and that those rights should be 
vindicated by officials of the state. For example, while tort doctrine 
outside the forest dealt with wrongs against men, that inside the 
forest was primarily concerned with wrongs against wildlife. These 
wrongs were categorized according to the immediacy of their effect 
on wildlife. ''Nocumentum speciale" prohibited those actions most 
directly injuring wildlife, such as the unauthorized release of hunting 
dogs within the forest.73 "Nocumentum commune," in contrast, 
was an act or omission that harmed men within the forest, such as 
the improper construction of a dam or the failure to keep a bridge 
in good repair. 74 But part of the reason for the prohibition of 
"nocumentum commune," Manwood explained, was the ultimate ef-
fect of such wrongs on wildlife. 75 An unrepaired bridge would 
cause people to detour from pathways and thereby disrupt wildlife 
69. These special officials included stewards, verderors, foresters, regarders, and 
agistors. Id. at 147. 
70. These special courts were known as courts of attachments, swainimote, and 
justice seats. Id. 
71. See id. at 144: 
But a Forest is not a privileged Place for all manner of wild Beasts or Fowls, 
but only for Beasts of Forest, Chase, and Warren, and no other, that is, for the 
Hart, the Hind, and the Hare which are Beasts of the Forest; the Buck, the Doe, 
the Fox, which are Beasts of the Chase; the Hare, the Cony, the Pheasant, and 
the Partridge, which are Beasts and Fowls of Warren, and no other. 
72. Manwood described the jurisdiction as a "territory of woody grounds and 
fruitful pastures, privileged for wild beasts and fowls of forest, chase and warren, to 
rest and abide there in the safe protection of the King for his delight and pleasure." 
Id. at 143. 
73. Id. at 208. 
74. Id. at 207. 
15. Id. 
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habitat; improper damming might drown a meadow not only pas-
tured by domestic stock, but also valued for wildlife forage. 
Plants were divided into categories according to their importance 
to forest animals. The doctrine of "special vert" gave particular pro-
tection to the mast- and fruit"'bearing plants on which deer fed.76 But 
appreciation was also manifest for the role of vegetation as shelter 
for wildlife from predation and weather; "nocumentum generale" re-
stricted the cutting of any plants that grew in sufficient density to 
provide cover. 77 
That wildlife was fundamental to the jurisdiction is also indicated 
by Manwood's assertion that when wildlife did not in fact live within 
an area of the forest, the forest dwellers might with impunity violate 
the prohibitions of its law.78 
E. The Interrelationship of the Goals 
Because the goals of wildlife law are not invariably consistent 
with one another, their interrelationships are significant. For exam-
ple, while it may be an exercise in anthropomorphism to believe that 
animals want to live, they certainly dislike pain. Rules that author-
ize hunting therefore may contravene the preferences of the hunted 
animals themselves. 79 Hunting laws, however, may be conducive to 
the health of the hunted species as a whole. Reproductive patterns 
have evolved to compensate for predation, and where man elim-
inates natural predators, as by the extermination of wolves in early 
Britain, 80 the prey species may suffer a population irruption. Its 
food supply may then be destroyed by overconsumption, which in 
turn may lead to starvation, disease, and death for much of the pop-
ulation. 81 In such cases, a sustained-yield policy may paradoxically 
support a larger number of animals than would survive were all hunt-
ing prohibited. 82 Moreover, to the extent that wildlife is valued as 
16. Id. at 356. 
77. Id. at 208. 
78. Id. at 145. 
79. The forest law did in fact reward certain animals that had distinguished 
themselves in the chase by granting them protection from future hunting. The 
"Hart-Royal proclaimed" was a six-year-old buck that won protection by eluding the 
king. Id. at 179-80. 
80. See id. at 161. 
81. See E. KoRMONDY, CONCEPTS OF ECOLOGY 97 (1969); Hairston, Smith & Slo-
bodkin, Community Structure, Population Control, and Competition in Population 
and Community Ecology, in READINGS IN POPULATION AND COMMUNITY EcOLOGY 
382 (W. Hazen ed. 1964). See also P. ERRINGTON, supra note 10, at 204-07. 
82. See I. GABRIELSON, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION 191-92 (1959) (discussing the 
dispute over whether predation produces beneficial or deleterious consequences). See 
also Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928) (discussing the permissibility of ex-
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a source of hunting pleasure, hunting helps to ensure that wildlife 
habitat is preserved from inconsistent economic exploitation. The 
Forest Jurisdiction well demonstrates the benefits that wildlife may 
derive from an interest in hunting. 
Policies aimed at a sustained yield of wildlife may also seem in-
consistent with sporting rules that restrict the use of effective 
weapons. These rules, which increase the costs of harvesting wild-
life, appear to conflict with the economic model that ranching pro-
vides: If "fair play" is not at issue in rounding up cattle, it might 
be equally inappropriate in harvesting deer. Law enforcement 
problems, however, may make early British practices defensible as 
the only practicable method to have ensured a sustained yearly 
harvest. A limit on the number of animals a hunter may kill might 
appear to be a more economically efficient way to assure that no 
species is reduced below the number that can provide a steady yield, 
but the difficulty of administering such limits might have made them 
unenforceable. When a large part of Britain was rustic or wild, the 
police problems involved in establishing that a hunter had exceeded 
his limit would have been far greater than those involved in estab-
lishing that he was hunting at an improper time or with a prohibited 
apparatus. 
The qualification statutes also appear to have been an effective, 
although discriminatory, method to protect wildlife against excessive 
pressure. But as large numbers of people came to abhor the 
scheme, the difficulties of enforcement increased. Those who op-
posed the qualification statutes were so numerous by the eighteenth 
century that illegal hunting may have reduced the wildlife population 
below that which a more acceptable policy would have preserved. 83 
. Resistance to the law was not confined to the unqualified. 
Qualified landowners might not only ignore poaching, but also per-
petrate subterfuges to help the unqualified circumvent the law. 
Many of the unqualified were fraudulently appointed "gamekeep-
ers" and as such authorized to hunt. In 1710, a limitation was im-
posed that a manor might have only one gamekeeper,84 but despite 
this restriction the practice continued. Six years later the lawmakers 
terminating deer in a preserve area because of grazing damage caused by a deer pop-
ulation-explosion). 
83. As a committee on the game laws observed, because trade in game was illegal 
"it is impossible to regulate the supply . . . . Large quantities of game are therefore 
sometimes wasted, and even thrown away." PARL. PAPERS (Commons), 1823 (260), 
[Reports] vol. 4, p. 110 (Report from the Select Committee on the Laws Relating 
to Game). Indeed, a poulterer estimated that one third of the game sent to London 
was not consumed. Id. at 118. 
84. 9 Anne, c. 25, § 1 (1710). 
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were compelled to observe that "under colour and pretence" of ap-
pointing gamekeepers: 
,[I]t is become usual and frequent in several parts of the kingdom, 
for lords and ladies of manors to grant powers and deputations to 
the farmers, tenants, and occupiers of the lands and estates lying 
within the precincts of their respective manors, to be game-keepers 
. . . which practice is a very great abuse of the powers intended . . . 
to be granted, and manifestly tends very much to the destruction of 
the game of this kingdom . . . . 85 
Landowners not rich enough to be qualified were even less receptive 
to the laws. As a parliamentary committee considering the qualifica-
tion statutes observed: 
[T]hose possessors of land who fall within the statuable disqualifica-
tions feel little or no interest in the preservation of Game; . . . they 
are less active in repressing the baneful practice of poaching, than 
if they remained entitled to kill and enjoy the Game found upon their 
own lands. Nor is it unnatural to suppose, that the injury done to 
·the crops in those situations where Game is superabundant, may in-
duce the possessors of land, thus circumstanced, rather to encourage 
than to suppress illegal modes of destroying it. 86 
II. METHODS 
Whatever the purposes of wildlife regulations, the methods em-
ployed have been divided by ecologists into three categories: re-
strictions on the take, habitat improvement, and artificial stocking. 87 
The former two are germane to British law prior to the American 
Revolution. 88 
A. Take Limitations 
The size of the take was restricted in Britain by four legislative 
techniques: (1) only limited numbers might hunt (2) during re-
stricted periods (3) with controlled apparatus ( 4) for animals whose 
value had been reduced. 
The qualification statutes were the principal means used in Brit-
ish law to restrict the number of hunters. They were defended, 
even during the waning years of the system, as a method to preserve 
game. As one apologist asserted, "[A]dmit a general right to take 
wild animals, and one of two things must follow-Game would be 
utterly destroyed or it would not."89 Although the latter prospect 
85. 3 Geo. 1, c. 11, § 1 (1716). 
86. Quoted in E. CHRISTIAN, supra note 15, at 74-75. 
87. See E. ODUM & H. ODUM, F'uNDAME.NTALS OF EcoLOGY 433 (2d ed. 1959). 
88. While stocking was extensively practiced in game parks, the technique was 
not closely regulated by law. 
89. C. LoNG, supra note 15, at 31. 
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may have been the more repugnant since it would have freed the 
rustic proletariat of the need to labor for their employers' benefit, 
the former was also to be feared, and the qualification statutes were 
equally intended to forestall this danger. 
The second legislative technique-limiting the periods for wild-
life taking-may in turn have secured several goals. First, it may 
have reduced the take to an extent that could not be offset 
by increased hunting during the "open period." British prohibi-
tion of hunting on those days when the legislators commended 
church attendance00 prevented many hunters from simply shifting 
their take to another time. Since virtually all holidays had some re-
ligious significance, only those without ordinary work (typically the 
rich and the poor) would have the leisure to hunt at other times. 
Second, this technique was apparently used to restrict taking dur-
ing those periods in the life cycle of a species when taking would 
be unproductive. Periods in a species' life cycle might be distin-
guished with respect to the animal's reproductive behavior, ability 
to evade capture, and value as a commodity. Early British law de-
veloped several doctrines to protect game during vulnerable repro-
ductive periods. Deer fawning season was the occasion for "fence-
month" within the Forest Jurisdiction.91 Forest officials annually 
convened before this time to devise strategies to make law enforce-
ment more effective, thereby to preserve the animals from any dis-
turbance. 92 Other laws also gave particular attention to breeding 
animals: gathering the eggs of birds was prohibited, 93 and, in the 
eighteenth century, salmon were protected during their spawning 
runs so that they might "become very plentiful and common . . . 
as they were formerly . . . ."94 
Physical changes in animals' defensive abilities were also the oc-
casion for British regulations. Birds were protected when "the said 
old fowl be moulted, and not replenished with feathers to fly, nor 
the young fowl fully feathered perfectly to fly . . . ."95 A subse-
quent moulting bird statute further exemplifies the technique of lim-
iting the take to those periods when the animals would be most valu-
able. The season was justified on the basis that the flesh of moult-
90. 13 Geo. 3, c. 80, § 6 (1773). 
91. J. MANwooD, supra note 5, at 134. 
92. Id. at 136-37. 
93. See, e.g., 25 Hen. 8, c. 11, § 5 (1533); 2Jac. 1, c. 27, § 27 (1604). 
94. 9 Anne, c. 26, § 2 (1710). 
95. 25 Hen. 8, c. 11, § 1 (1533). 
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ing birds had been found "unsavory and unwholesome, to the 
prejudice of those that buy them . . . ."96 Harvesting animals at 
juvenile stages was also condemned as wasteful. A seventeenth-
century law set a minimum size for Iobsters.97 Fish fry required ex-
press protection because "in divers places they feed swine and dogs 
with the fry and spawn of fish . . . ."98 
A sixteenth-century law limiting hunting in fields while grain was 
in ear99 typifies the last purpose of restrictive hunting periods-mini-
mizing interference by hunters with other productive activities. 
The third legislative method of limiting take-controlling ap-
paratus-was embodied in the prohibition of various hunting meth-
ods found to be wasteful, excessively successful, or "unsporting." 
Minimum net sizes protected fish fry,100 jacklighting was restrict-
ed, 101 and hunters of herons were limited to hawking or the long 
bow.102 The qualification statutes often prohibited not only the tak-
ing of game, but also the possession of hunting apparatus.103 
The final legislative technique-decreasing the value of an ani-
mal-is an effective means of reducing the harvest. Wildlife is typ-
ically taken in areas that pose difficulties to law enforcement. By 
changing the operative fact for the offense from capture to sale, leg-
islators can shift violations of the game laws to a public and social 
context. Although this technique was recognized by early British 
lawmakers, 104 it was not found sufficiently politic to employ rigor-
ously. Sale and purchase by the unqualified was restricted, 100 but 
such was the "artificial pre-eminence of Game," "a forbidden 
96. 9 Anne, c. 25, § 4 (1710). Deer hunting was restricted out of season "be-
cause [deer] are not able to run, and are worth nothing when caught." J. MANWOOJ>, 
supra note 5, at 299. 
97. 11 Will. 3, c. 24, § 12 (1699). 
98. 1 Eliz. 1, c. 17, § 1 (1558). 
99. 23 Eliz. 1, c. 10, § 4 (1581). This statute employs the interesting technique 
of keying a prohibition not to a calendar period in the hope that the event will occur 
during that period, but rather to the event .itself. 
100. 1 Eliz. 1, c. 17, § 3 (1558). A statute also required that eel pots be covered 
in order to protect mature salmon. 4 Anne, c. 21, § 5 (1705). 
101. 23 Eliz. 1, c. 10, § 6 (1581). See text at notes 33-35 supra, 
102. 19 Hen. 7, c. 11, § 9 (1503). 
103. See, e.g., 13 Rich. 2, c. 3 (1389); 33 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 1 (1541). See also 
2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 14 (1548). 
104. See, e.g., 32 Hen. 8, c. 8 (1540); 9 Anne, c. 25, § 1 (1710). In addition, 
when the whipping and hard labor mandated by 4 & 5 W. & M., c. 23, § 3 (1692), 
were found insufficient to deter the burning of plants critical to the well-being of 
grouse, the legislature prohibited the purchase of the ashes of those plants from unli• 
censed sellers. 5 Anne, c. 14, § 5 (1706). 
105. See, e.g., 32 Hen. 8, c. 8 (1540); 2 Jae. 1, c. 27, § 4 (1604); 9 Anne, c, 
25, § 2 (1710). 
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fruit,"106 that lawmakers would not prohibit the qualified from pur-
chasing the delicacy, even from poachers.107 Indeed, the ruling 
classes supported lawbreakers to such degree that a professor of law 
lamented that "children and domestics all are conscious that the table 
of the master of the house is furnished with the spoils of iniquity.mos 
B. Habitat Development 
Regulating the takers of wildlife is an obvious method of control-
ling animal numbers. But that technique is not the most effective 
way to deal with diminishing populations. As two distinguished 
ecologists have asserted: "When game begins to get scarce, people 
generally think and act in the order [of ( 1) preservation of breed-
ing stock by means of game laws restricting the harvest; (2) artificial 
stocking; and (3) habitat improvement], which is sometimes unfor-
tunate, since the third item is often more important than the first 
two. If suitable habitat is lacking . . . protection or stocking is use-
less."109 
British legislators at the earliest stage regarded the development 
of wildlife habitat as essential to wildlife preservation. While the 
Forest Jurisdiction differed from some present-day wildlife reserves 
in that the jurisdiction by design included private land holdings that 
were farmed and developed for other uses, 110 the forest law sought 
to harmonize these uses with the requirements of wildlife habitat. 
A landowner, for example, might develop his property, but he was 
required to retain adequate vegetation for wildlife forage and 
cover.111 Moreover, all land within the forest was subject to an ease-
ment for the benefit of wildlife so that during the winter, when 
browse was scarce, forest officials might enter private land and cut 
down vegetation and take branches to feed wildlife.112 
106. C. LoNG, supra note 15, at 43. 
107. E. CHRISTIAN, supra note 15, at 179. Commentators had made the sugges-
tion that the best method to preserve game would be to make illegal the purchase 
as well as the sale. See S. PURLEw.ENT, supra note 16, at x-xi. 
108. E. CmuSTIAN, supra note 15, at 298. 
109. E. ODUM & H. ODUM, supra note 87, at 433. The Odums also stated: 
[O]ften the best way to "control" a particular organism, whether we wish to en-
courage or discourage it, is to modify the community, rather than to make a di-
rect "attack" on the organism. For example, it has been demonstrated time and 
again that we have a better quail population by maintaining the particular biotic 
community in which the quail is most successful than by raising and releasing 
birds or manipulating any one set of limiting factors (such as predators, for ex-
ample). 
Id. at 246. See also P. MATI'HIESSEN, WILDLIFE IN AMERICA 205 (1959). 
110. J. MANWOOD, supra note 5, at 375. 
111. Id. at 360,381. 
112. Id. at 164. 
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Livestock must be limited if wildlife is to thrive, 113 and special 
doctrines regulated ranching. The forest law restricted some com-
moners to the number of stock that could be fed on their own land 
during the winter.114 A "commoner sans number," who by the com-
mon law could run stock without limit, by the forest law was required 
to preserve wildlife forage.ms Shepherding practices were subject 
to a prohibition against "staff-herding." Herders were prohibited 
from driving their cattle from pasture to pasture within the forest 
because the shepherds' presence would deter deer from exercising 
their equal rights to these productive areas. 116 
Restrictions limited the possession of other animals that posed 
dangers to forest wildlife. A license was required to run sheep or 
goats because those stock "taint the pasture where they feed, that 
the beasts of the forest will not depasture there; so that they do, as 
it were, banish them from every place where they are."117 Watch-
dogs were potentially even more damaging to wildlife, and Manwood 
described the draconian measure employed to forestall their aggres-
.siveness: 
Three claws of the fore-feet shall be cut off by the Skin: And accord-
ingly the same is now used, by setting one of his Fore-feet upon a 
piece of Wood eight Inches thick, and a Foot square, and then setting 
a Chisel of two Inches broad upon the three Clawr of his Fore-foot, 
to strike them off at one Blow; and this is the manner of expediting 
· Mastiffs.118 
Where there was insufficient forage for both game and stock, the 
grantee of the rights for domestic forage had to reduce his herd. In-
deed, if wildlife were so to increase as to require all the forage, the 
stockman would be completely ousted.119 
Because forest landowners suffered these burdens on their pri-
vate lands, even without petition they were accorded the privilege 
113. REPORT OF THE 60TH CONVENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
GAME, FISH, AND CONSERVATION COMMISSIONERS 35 (1970) (statement of Repre• 
sentative John Dingell). 
114. J. MANwooD, supra note 5, al 87. 
115. Id. at 94-95. 
116. Id. at 98. 
117. Id. at 7. 
118. Id. at 116. A commentator on American wildlife management has con• 
firmed the significance of the domestic dog as a predator: 
Probably more destructive in the aggregate than any of the foregoing animals 
{wolf, bobcat, coyote, fox, black bear, golden eagle, and mountain lion], unless 
it be the mountain lion, is the domestic dog. In settled regions this animal is 
the predator of prime importance, due to its universal presence and the persist-
ence of its attacks. Once a dog acquires the deer-hunting habit, it must be dealt 
with summarily, for the habit is not otherwise easily discouraged. 
1 R 'TruPPBNSEB, WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 210 (1948). 
119. J. MANWOOD, supra note 5, at 237. 
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of commoning forest land.120 
ill. THE LESSONS OF EARLY LAW 
Three areas of current concern for those interested in wildlife 
are the destruction of wildlife habitat for economic development, the 
relationship between gun control and wildlife law, and the conflict 
between hunters and those interested in wildlife for other reasons. 
While early British law may not be binding precedent in these 
areas, 121 the system is a worthwhile counterpoise against which to 
balance current policies. 
Although the Second Circuit has observed that cost "in our afflu-
ent society . . . is only one of several factors" to be considered in 
determining whether environmental values should be preserved,"122 
economic crises repeatedly undercut policies that limit economic 
productivity. From the vantage point of early British law, with its 
willingness to protect wildlife habitat at the expense of power pro-
duction, 123 lumbering, 124 and food resources, 125 recent restrictions 
can be viewed not as novel incursions into the "rights" of property 
owners, but rather as the continuing manifestations of regulations 
long a part of Anglo-American jurisprudence. Present resistance to 
the federal statute protecting eagles, 126 for example, appears im-
proper in light of the ancient history of raptor preservation. Even 
in the fifteenth century, landowners were prohibited from disturbing 
various hawks regardless of "any hurt by them done . . . ." Nor 
did the law countenance indirect measures to eliminate these valued 
birds: no landowner might "purposely drive them out of their 
coverts accustomed to breed in, to cause them to go to other coverts 
to breed .... " All men were to "suffer them to pass at their liber-
120. Id. at 99. 
121. See Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829) (Story, J.): "The 
common law of England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America. 
Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, and claimed it as their birth-
right; but they brought with them and adopted only that portion which was appli-
cable to their situation." An early Georgia case rejected the British forest and game 
laws as "not only penal to a feudal degree, but . • • productive of tyranny." State 
v. Campbell, 1 T.U.P. Charlt. 166, 168 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1808). 
122. Scenic Hudsqn Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
123. See, e.g., 13 Edw. 1, c. 47 (1285); 13 Rich. 2, c. 19 (1389); 17 Rich. 2, 
c. 9 (1393). 
124. See J. MANWOOD, supra note 5, at 374. 
125. See text at notes 113-16 supra. 
126. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1970). See Harris, Is the-Golden Eagle a Murderer of 
Lambs or lust a Nice Bird?, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1970, at 1, col. 4 (eastern 
ed.). 
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ties . "127 Similarly, one must weigh those American decisions 
that have held unconstitutional legislation restricting landowners' 
rights to kill damage-feasant wildlife128 against the protection the 
Forest Jurisdiction afforded such animals. 
But British wildlife law further shows that landowners subject to 
wildlife damage have at times been compensated for that cost. The 
Forest Jurisdiction granted subject landowners special rights of com-
mon in the forest. 129 This early policy might be considered, for ex-
ample, in settling the persistent controversy regarding the historic 
federal policy permitting landowners in the western United States 
to pasture stock in adjoining public lands for a charge less than the 
fair market value of the grazing rights.130 Where base properties 
are subject to depredations as wildlife move between federal and pri-
vate land, one might defend landowner privileges within federal 
lands on the same basis that John Manwood rationalized those of 
the forest inhabitants: "[S]ince the deer have fed on their grounds, 
'tis reasonable they should have common."131 
The demise of the British qualification statutes provides an ex-
ample of the difficulty of instituting and enforcing policies that are 
bitterly disputed by the landowners controlling wildlife habitat. Pro-
vision of compensation for wildlife burdens may help make restric-
tive laws more palatable. This theme has been emphasized by other 
commentators on wildlife policy. Professor Christian concluded 
from the history of wildlife law that, were the land occupier given 
some right to game, soon he would thoughtfully consider how he 
might support rather than destroy those animals upon his land. 132 
Aldo Leopold, a prominent American conservationist, observed: 
"The only conceivable motive which might activate a sufficient num-
ber of non-shooting landholders [to manage for game] is the finan-
cial motive."133 This thought finally has been transformed into policy 
in states such as Texas, where a game department official recently 
stated: 
127. 11 Hen. 7, c. 17, § 17 (1494). 
128. ·E.g., State v. Rathbone, 110 Mont. 225, 100 P.2d 86 (1949); Cross v. State, 
370 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1962). 
129. J. MANWOOD, supra note 5, at 129. See text at note 120 supra. 
130. See PUBLIC LAND LAW R.BvlBW COMMISSION, ONB THmD OF THB NATION'S 
LAND 117 (1970). 
131. J. MANwooD, supra note 5, at 129. 
132. E. CHRISTIAN, supra note 15, at 304. 
133. A. LEOPOLD, GAME MANAGEMENT 398 (1933). One of Leopold's five 
theorems of game management is that "[o]nly the landholder can practice game man-
agement cheaply." Id. at 395. See also 1 R. ThIPPBNSBB, supra note 118, at 407. 
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,[O]ur studies in Texas have shown -that one adult white-tail can take 
up quite a bit of range room. Six of these old does eat as much as 
one 750-pound cow, five sheep or five goats. So it has been neces-
sary for our Department to approach the ranger who is producing the 
game on some sort of a basis which he recognizes, and that basis of 
course, is the dollar bill.134 
The lessons of the qualification statutes with regard to both the 
privilege to use weapons and the privilege to enjoy wildlife are some-
what more ambiguous. Blackstone's reprobation of the forest and 
game laws as owing "their immediate original to slavery"135 provided 
an impelling spirit for American opposition to gun control. His 
fervor may have led him to an attitude of vigilant resistance even 
to apparently necessary regulation. 136 Indeed, an American editor 
of Blackstone observed in 1803 that "[a]n attentive perusal" of 
Blackstone's commentary establishes that the game laws 
are among •the powerful instruments of state-enginery, for the purpose 
of retaining the mass of the people in a state of the most abject sub-
jection . . . so that the whole nation are completely disarmed, and 
left at the mercy of the government, under the pretext of preserving 
.the breed of hares and partridges, for the exclusive use of the inde-
pendent country gentlemen. In America we may reasonably hope 
that the people will never cease to regard the right of keeping and 
bearing arms as the surest pledge of their liberty.137 
Still, the British experience does not conclude the case against 
weapons control. The qualification statutes in essence functioned 
to arm a favored class as well as to disarm a potentially dissident one. 
The system divided society into two groups: a camp of armed bene-
ficiaries of the established rule and a disarmed outer circle of those 
suspected to be dissidents.138 Both existing and proposed weapons-
control legislation in the United States respond to different consider-
ations. Social forces rather than statutory design have arguably suc-
ceeded in dividing American society into separate armed and dis-
armed camps, though ironically the scheme may be the inverse of 
that the British lawmakers sought to create. Proponents of gun con-
trol now seek not to further that division, but rather to achieve some 
parity within society through generally applicable restrictions. 
American law has also never sought to segregate wildlife for the 
taste of a privileged class of hunters. Both the inclination of 
134. REPORT OF nm 56m CONVJ!NTION OF nm INTERNATIONAL AssocIATION OF 
GAME, FISH AND CONSERVATION COMMISSIONERS 146 (1966) (comments of E.A. 
Walker). 
135. 2 BLACKS'J'9NE, supra note 22, at *412. 
136. See id. at *413. 
137. 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES *414 n.3 (St. George Tucker ed. 1803). 
138. See, e.g., 33 Hen. 8, c. 6, §§ 1-3 (1541); 2 ·& 3 Edw. 6, c. 14 (1548). 
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the settlers (who included men exiled from Britain for poaching 
deer139) and the geography of the New World ensured the rejection 
of the qualification scheme. As one court asked rhetorically, how 
could such a scheme "apply to a country which was but one extended 
forest, in which the liberty of killing a deer, or cutting down a tree, 
was as unrestrained as the natural rights of the deer to rove, or the 
tree to grow: and where was the aristocracy whose privileges were 
to be secured?"140 Indeed, without restrictive laws, the "artificial 
pre-eminence of Game"141 was so lacking from the American taste 
that it became necessary to compel sportsmen to retrieve some 
quarry rather than leave it to rot where it fell.142 
However, contention about whether the law should protect the 
taste of a single group has not disappeared; it has simply changed 
form. The dispute over whether men should be allowed to kill other 
animals for pleasure threatens to produce a new qualification test: 
Each side includes those as eager to have their views alone prevail 
as were the sporting gentry intent to arrogate to themselves the sole 
right to game.143 
Both hunters and protectors have affected the present govern-
ment policies in the United States. Hunters have kept ninety per-
cent of federal public lands open to their sport.144 And their voices 
have had inordinate weight within state wildlife departments because 
those agencies have been funded through revenues derived from 
hunting and fishing.145 On the other hand, those who condemn 
139. Seven years exile in America was the penalty for breaking into an enclosure 
to take deer. 5 Geo. 1, c. 28, § 1 (1719). See also 10 Geo. 2, c. 32, § 7 (1737). 
140. State v. Campbell, 1 T.U.P. Charlt. 166, 166-67 (Ga. Super. 1808). 
141. C. LONG, supra note 15, at 43. 
142. See, e.g., WYO. SrAT. ANN. § 23.1-77(a) (Supp. 1975) ("No person shall 
take and leave, abandon or allow any game bird, game fish, or game animal except 
trophy game animal, or edible portion, to intentionally. or needlessly go to waste"). 
143. This controversy has recently surfaced in the dispute generated by the televi-
sion special The Guns of Autumn and its sequel Echoes of the Guns of Autumn. 
See Brown, CBS Hunting Show Loses Ads After Gun Club Calls, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
6, 1975, at 1, col. 2 (late city ed.); O'Connor, "The Guns of Autumn" Hunted the 
Hunter, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1975, § 2, at 25, col. 1 (late city ed.); O'Connor, T.V.: 
"Guns of Autumn" Draws a Bead on Hunting, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1915, at 59, col. 
1 (late city ed.). 
144. COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF FISHERY AND WILDLIFE BI-
OLOGY, FISH AND WILDLIFE RESOURCES ON THE PUBLIC LANDS 148 (1969) [herein-
after COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY REPORT]. 
145. See Hearings on S. 2951, S. 3212 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at '83 (1968) (statement of Dr. Alfred Etter): 
[F]ew game and fish agencies are making a determined effort to obtain broader 
public support. Hunting and fishing interests want to preserve the special posi-
tion they acquire through payment of the lion's share of the costs through Iicenso 
fees. They are also afraid that if the entire public contributed to the support 
of wildlife activities the hunter's voice would often be drowned out by the per-
centage of the population that does not hunt. 
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hunting have secured both state and federal protection for species 
that only recently were not only hunted, but were subject to 
bounties. 146 Protectors have also succeeded in excluding hunting 
from many national parks and wildlife reserves.147 Future legisla-
tive development should consciously balance the interests of these 
two groups rather than accede to the demands of either. 
Moreover, the extremists of both sides might reassess their posi-
tions. So malodorous a precedent are the qualification laws that 
those who would dedicate wildlife to a single interest ought to take 
stock of the current of history to which ~ey belong. They should 
consider whether the relationship between humans and animals 
merits more concern than relationships between people. The con-
flict between hunters and protectors benefits neither because it dissi-
pates resources needed by both groups to marshal against other his-
toric dangers. Destruction of wildlife habitat threatens the interests 
of both far more than do their internecine disputes.148 To meet this 
threat of irreversible harm to wildlife, each group needs the other's 
.support. 
L. Glasgow, former Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Fish, Wildlife, and 
Parks, has stated: 
The emphasis in the States has been on the bird, animal or fish which the 
license buyer can kill and take home. And you [state wildlife officials] have 
most hunters and fishermen in your corner. But you are losing the great ma-
jority who neither hunt nor fish. They are anything but a silent majority. You 
had better do more to enlist them in your cause. 
(And before the Chair entertains a dozen requests from the floor, I want 
to hurry to add that I remember where money comes from in States for land 
purchase, research and management. And I have not forgotten for a minute 
whose payday is made possible through purchase of hunting and fishing licenses • . . . ) . 
REPORT OF THE 60TH CoNVENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GAME, 
FISH AND CONSERVATION COMMISSIONERS 31-32 (1970). 
146. According to the U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, the following 
threatened predators among others have received various forms of protection: 
northern rocky mountain wolf (protected in Yellowstone and Glacier National 
Parks); eastern timber wolf (having declined because of hunting and trapping pres-
sure for bounties, this species is now protected in Michigan, and bounties have been 
reduced to only a localized basis in Minnesota); grizzly bear (complete protection 
in Washington, Colorado, and Idaho, as well as federal protection in national parks); 
and Florida panther (protected by law in Florida since 1966). U.S. BUREAU OF 
SPORT FISHERIES AND Wll.DLIFE, DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, 'THREATENED Wll.DLIFE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 207-74 (1973). 
147. See PUBLIC LAND LAW R.Bvmw CoMMISSION, supra note 130, at 164; CoLo-
RADO STATE UNIVERSITY REPORT, supra note 144, at 39-41. 
148. See Comment, Vanishing Wildlife and Federal Protective Efforts, 1 EcoL-
OGY L.Q. 520, 528-29 ( 1971): 
In addition to his attempts to capture or kill wildlife, man also threatens species 
when his actions directly or indirectly alter the natural environment in which 
animals live. Such habitat alteration is usually even more destructive than 
[direct efforts to kill or capture wildlife] because in addition to being almost 
impossible to restore affected areas, all animal forms within the ecosystem are 
affected. Ecosystem alteration is, in fact, the principal cause of the loss of spe-
cies. 
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The Forest Jurisdiction represents a more sophisticated compro-
mise of economic interests with wildlife production than any legal 
system since adopted. The king's policy flowed from both his fervor 
as a hunter and his belief that he was responsible toward more than 
just his human subjects. Economic threats to wildlife can be sur-
mounted by hunters and protectors only if they can join together in 
a comparable unity of-purpose. 
